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Abstract
We consider the dynamics of player’s strategies in repeated market games,
where the selection of strategies is determined by a learning model. Prior
theoretical analysis and experimental data show that after large number of
plays the average number of agents who decide to enter, per round of the
game, approaches the market capacity and, after a longer wait, agents are
being sorted into two groups: the agents in one group rarely enter the mar-
ket, and in the other, the agents enter almost all the time. In this paper
we obtain estimates of the characteristic times it takes for both patterns to
emerge in the repeated plays of the game. The estimates are given in terms
of the parameters of the game, assuming that the number of agents is large,
the number of rounds of the game per unit of time is large, and the charac-
teristic change of the propensity per game is small. Our approach is based on
the analysis of the partial differential equation for the function f(t, q) that
describes the distribution of agents according to their level of propensity to
enter the market, q, at time t.
Keywords: Market entry games, Reinforcement learning, Drift-Diffusion
equations
1. Introduction
A class of games in the study of social and econonmic behavior, called
market entry games, describes a conflict situation when players (agents) in a
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group choose between two strategies: enter the market or stay out, and the
agent’s payoff is determined solely by the number of agents who decide to
enter and the action he or she takes.
The game has a single symmetric, mixed equilibrium and, a number of
asymmetric pure and mixed equilibria.
The extensive theoretical and experimental work has been done on under-
standing which, if any, of the equilibrium strategies emerge when the game
is played repeatedly by not agents who, independently from each other, try
to adopt to changing “market conditions.” The situation can by formalized,
by introducing into a model the individual propensities for agents to play
a particular strategy. The propensities are updated after each round of the
game. They might be determined by the agent’s payoffs, as in the basic re-
inforcement learning model, introduced in Erev and Roth (1998), or might
depend on more information about the game available to agents, such as in
the fictitious stochastic play, see Fudenberg and Levine (1998).
When the number of players is large, the following patterns of behavior
are typically observed and predicted by learning models, see for example
Duffy and Hopkins (2003):
1. The average number of entries per round of the game quickly approaches
the market capacity. This is referred to as “aggregate learning”.
2. In a long-run of repeated plays agent’s strategies converge to an asym-
metric pure equilibrium, compatible with the market capacity. This is
called “sorting”.
Both phenomena are ubiquitous in the market entry games in which
agents use either basic reinforcement learning or fictitious stochastic play.
It is observed that the aggregate learning emerges quite quickly and it takes
much longer time to observe sorting, see Duffy and Hopkins (2003).
The purpose of the present paper to give an estimate on the time scales of
both phenomena, in terms of the number of agents, N, the number of games,
M, played per unit of time, and the characteristic payoff h per game. We
show that the time of the aggregate learning is of the order
τal =
1
MNh
,
and the time after which the sorting becomes noticeable is
τs =
1
MNh2
.
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One might expect that the formulas like these are only valid in a certain
asymptotic regime, since the game is stochastic. This is indeed the case
as the estimates are derived under the conditions that N,M are large, h is
small, and MNh is finite. Interestingly, the estimates are the same for both
models of the basic reinforcement learning and fictitious stochastic play.
Our approach is based on the derivation of a partial differential equation
for the the distribution of agents among the propensity line. The equation is
a drift-diffusion equation, with the drift velocity proportional to (τal)
−1, and
the diffusion coefficient proportional to (τs)
−1.
2. The game and adaptive learning models
There are N agents participating in the game. Let δi denote the indicator
function for agent i to enter the game: δi = 1 if the agent enters, and δi = 0,
otherwise. Let c ∈ N be the capacity of the market, that we take for the
simplicity of the presentation to be an integer. Let m be the number of the
agents who enter the market, h be the characteristic payoff, and v > 0 be
the compensation for participating in the game. Then, the payoff to agent i,
can be defined, for example, as
pii =
{
v if δi = 0,
v + h(c−m) if δi = 1,
see Erev and Rapoport (1998).
In the basic reinforcement learning, due to Erev and Roth (1998), the
game is played repeatedly, and the state of the agent i, is defined by the
propensities to enter and stay out after nth round of the game:
(qi1,n, q
i
2,n) ∈ R
2,
The probability that agent i uses in deciding to enter is given by
yin =
qi1,n
qi1,n + q
i
2,n
.
To reduce the number of parameters, in order to simplify the presentation,
let us assume that v = 0. In this case the propensity to stay out does not
changes in time: qi2,n = q
i
2,0. Furthermore, let us assume that for any i = 1..N,
and some q ∈ R, the propensity to stay our are the same for all agents:
qi2,n = q0 > 0.
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Consiquently we need to consider only one the propensity to enter the market
which we denote by qin. Under such assumptions the probability for agent i
to enter the marker equals
yin =
qin
qin + q
.
To use this formula one has to make sure that propensities qin stay nonneg-
ative. In fact, the explicit formula for the probability function will not be
needed in our analysis, and we opt to use a generic probability function
yin = p(q
i
n), (1)
where p = p(q) ∈ [0, 1] is strictly increasing, twice differentiable function
such that
p(−∞) = 1− p(+∞) = 0.
In this way, the nonnegativty of the propensities is not required.
We consider two models of learning. In the model of basic reinforcement
(with v = 0), by Erev and Roth (1998), the propensity is increased/decreased
by the amount of the payoff in (n + 1)th game:
qin+1 = q
i
n + hδ
i
n(c−mn), (2)
where δin is the indicator function of the action of player i in n
th game, and
mn is the number of agent who enter the game.
In second model, the agents have more information about the game, which
is relfected by fact that the propensity in (2) is increased by the amount of
the payoff agent i would get if he/she played the opposite strategy:
qin+1 = q
i
n + h(c−mn)− h(1− δ
i
n), (3)
see Duffy and Hopkins (2005).
2.1. The method of the distribution function
Using the theory of stochastic approximation of Bena¨ım (1999), Duffy
and Hopkins (2005) prove that the repeated market entry games with ei-
ther basic reinforcement learning or fictitious stochastic play, under rather
generic condition, the agents strategies converge with probability one, to an
asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium. In that approach, models (2) and (3)
are considered as dynamical systems of size N, that describe the individual
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propensity of all agents, as they involve under the stochastic updating rule.
It is quite remarkable that the asymptotic behavior can be established for
such complicated systems.
In this paper we take a different approach, which is based on the deriva-
tion of the kinetic drift-diffusion equation for the distribution of the agents
according to their propensity levels.
Define the time step τ = 1/M, where M is the number of rounds of the
game per unit of time. The game takes place at times
tn = nτ, n = 1, 2, 3...
If the initial propensities qi0 are discretized to the mesh {qk = kh}, k ∈ Z,
then for all times tn, propensities q
i
n belong to the same mesh.
We are interested in the function f(tn, q) which is determined as the
proportion of all agents that have propensity q = qk, k ∈ Z, at time tn.
That is, f(tn, q) is PMF (probability mass function) for the propensity of a
randomly selected agent. We may write
f(tn, q) =
∑
k
αnkδ(q − qk),
where δ(q − qk) is the delta mass supported at qk, and α
n
k are non-negative
numbers, summing up over k to 1. They are defined as
αnk =
# of agents at time tn with propensity qk
N
.
We are interested in two integrals of f. The first,
a(tn) =
∫
p(q)f(tn, q) dq (4)
is the fraction of the average number of entries to the market at (n + 1)th
round, and the second
b(tn) =
∫
p(q)(1− p(q))f(tn, q) dq ≥ 0, (5)
that we call the coefficient of sorting. The sorting of the population of agents
into two groups is expressed by the smallness of b(t), since it implies that
f(t, q) is supported either on large negative q′s (rarely enter the market) or
on large positive values (enter almost all the time).
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We investigate the conditions under which a(t) approaches the fraction of
the market capacity c/N and b(t) converges to zero. Thus, when working with
the distribution function, we can not say to which particular equilibrium the
system converges, but we still have enough information to say that the system
does approaches an equilibrium and the equilibrium is a pure asymmetric one.
Let us also mention that studying distribution functions, instead of the
dynamics of individual particles (agents) is a classical approach in Science,
with the examples ranging from the Boltzmann equation of gas dynamics
and the diffusion processes describing the Brownian motion to equations for
distribution of commodities in social and economic studies, see Feller (1957),
Ch. XIV, and Pareschi & Toscani (2014).
2.2. Time scales
We will show in Appendix A that in the asymptotic regime
N →∞, h→ 0, τ → 0,
Nh
τ
→ r,
for some r ∈ R+, the density f(t, q) of the basic reinforcement learning verifies
the following nonlinear drift-diffusion equation.
∂tf + r(κ− a)∂q(p(q)f)−
1
2
(rNh(κ− a)2 + rhb)∂2q (p(q)f) = 0, (6)
with
a =
∫
p(q)f(t, q) dq, b =
∫
p(1− p)f(t, q) dq,
where κ = c/N > 0 is the capacity of the market expressed as a fraction of
the total population of agents.
The equation (6) has rather simple structure.
It consists of diffusion of the density, with the diffusion coefficient
µ(t, q) =
1
2
(rNh(κ− a)2 + rhb)p′(q) > 0,
and the drift (transport) of the density f with the velocity
v(t, q) = r(κ− a(t))p(q)− µp′(q).
In this notation equation (6) takes the form:
∂tf + ∂q(vf)− ∂q(µ∂qf) = 0.
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We will show in Appendix B that in the long run a(t) approaches κ and
the characteristic time of this convergence is
τal =
1
r
. (7)
On the other hand b(t) approaches zero and with the characteristic time
τs =
1
rh
. (8)
Note in particular that the sorting is slow compared with the aggregate learn-
ing:
τs ≫ τal.
The equation (6) provides a convenient description of processes governing
the dynamics of repeated games. Starting from the initial distribution of
propensities, the system quickly moves towards the state of the aggregate
learning by punishing or rewarding all agents for deviations from the market
capacity κ. This is expressed in (6) by the drift velocity being proportional
to (κ− a(t)).
The stochastic nature of the decisions that agents make and their inde-
pendence result in the tendency of the individual propensities to spread out
over the propensity space, which is expressed by the diffusion part of the
equation (6). This results in the convergence of f(t, q) → 0, for every q,
meaning that fewer agents are using mixed strategies to play the game, lead-
ing to sorting. The sorting requires significant amount of time since diffusion
coefficient is small.
2.3. Time scales for the second model of learning
For the model of learning (3) the density f verifies a similar equation
∂tf + r(κ− a)∂qf −
1
2
(rNh(κ− a)2 + rhb)∂2qf = 0, (9)
which lead to the same estimates for time scales (7) and (8).
Note here the difference between equations (6) and (9): the drift velocity
and the diffusion coefficient in the model of fictitious play is homogeneous
(independent of) in the propensity q, whereas in (6) both proportional to the
probability p(q). The later case indicates that the intensity of the drift and
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diffusion is larger for agents who have higher probability (and thus propen-
sity) to enter. This, in fact, is expected, as the only way to change the
propensity of an agent in the reinforcement model is for her to enter the
market.
This difference results in the sorting being somewhat faster for agents
with low propensity in the model (9), once the system gets close to the
equilibrium.
Appendix A. The drift-diffusion equation
In this section we give a heuristic derivation of drift-diffusion equations
(6) and (9). Consider a repeated market entry game with basic reinforcement
learning (1), (2).
Let f(tn, q) be the PMF of the propensity of a randomly selected agent,
as in section 2.1, and Xn be a random variable with this PMF.
At time t = tn we select an agent at random and observe her propensity
level: qˆ = Xn. The probability that the agent will enter market at the next
round is pˆ = p(qˆ). qˆ belongs to the mesh {kh} and we denote the correspond-
ing mesh number
kˆ =
qˆ
h
∈ Z.
If k 6= kˆ, there are Nf(tn, qk) = Nα
n
k agents that have propensity qk;
if k = kˆ, there are Nαn
kˆ
− 1 agents (besides the one we selected) that have
propensity qˆ.
Since each agent behaves independently from others, the number of agents
among Nαnk (or Nα
n
kˆ
− 1) who will enter at the next round is a binomial
random variable, that we denote Xnk (or X
n
kˆ
):
Xnk ∈ B(pk, Nα
n
k), pk = p(qk), k 6= kˆ,
and
Xn
kˆ
∈ B(pkˆ, Nα
n
kˆ
− 1).
Here B(n, p) stands for the binomial distribution of successes in n Bernoulli
trials, with the probability of success p.
We compute the expectation and the variance of Xnk ,
E[Xnk ] = Nα
n
kpk, V (X
n
k ) = Nα
n
kpk(1− pk), k 6= kˆ,
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and
E[Xn
kˆ
] = (Nαn
kˆ
− 1)pkˆ, V (X
n
kˆ
) = (Nαn
kˆ
− 1)pkˆ(1− pkˆ).
Let mˆn be the total number of agents who enter the market, not counting
the selected one, i.e.,
mˆn =
∑
k
Xnk .
Then, using the pairwise independence of Xnk ’s,
E[mˆn] = N
∫
p(q)f(tn, q) dq − pkˆ,
and
V (mˆn) = N
∫
p(q)(1− p(q))f(tn, q) dq − pkˆ(1− pkˆ).
Let δˆn be the indicator function for the selected agent to enter the mar-
ket, which is, by design of the model, independent of mˆn. For such random
variable,
Prob(δˆn = 1) = 1− Prob(δˆn = 0) = pkˆ.
At the next time, t = tn+1, the propensity of the selected player to enter the
market by (2) equals
Xn+1 = Xn + δˆnh(c− mˆn − 1). (A.1)
We will assume that Xn+1 is a good approximation of the propensity to enter
the market of a randomly selected agent at time t = tn+1. In other words, the
distribution of Xn+1 is given by f(tn+1, q).
This assumption suffices to the derive the equation for f(t, q). Let φ be
a test function and compute
∫
φ(qˆ)f(tn+1, qˆ) dqˆ = E[φ(Xn+1)] = E[φ(Xn + δˆnh(c− mˆn)]
=
∫
(p(qˆ)E[φ(qˆ + h(c− mˆn − 1))] + (1− p(qˆ))φ(qˆ)) f(tn, qˆ) dqˆ. (A.2)
Using the Taylor’s expansion
φ(qˆ + z) = φ(qˆ) + φ′(qˆ)z +
φ′′(qˆ)
2
z2 + o(z2),
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we obtain from the previous computation:
∫
φ(qˆ)
(
f(tn+1, qˆ)− f(tn, qˆ)
τ
)
dqˆ =
h
τ
∫
φ′(qˆ)p(qˆ)E[c−mˆn−1]f(tn, qˆ) dqˆ
+
h2
2τ
∫
φ′′(qˆ)p(qˆ)E[(c− mˆn − 1)
2]f(tn, qˆ) dq +
ho(h)
τ
. (A.3)
Next we compute
E[c− mˆn − 1] = c−N
∫
p(q)f(tn, q) dq + p(qˆ)− 1
≈ N
(
c/N −
∫
pf(tn, q) dq
)
, (A.4)
where we assumed that N is large. In a similar way,
E[(c− mˆn − 1)
2] = (c− E[mˆn]− 1)
2 + V (mˆn)
≈
(
N2(c/N −
∫
pf(tn, q) dq)
2 +N(
∫
p(1− p)f(tn, q) dq)
)
. (A.5)
Finally we assume that τ, Nh are small and r =
Nh
τ
, κ =
c
N
are finite.
Returning to (A.3) and retaining only higher order terms we obtain an
integral equation
∫
φ(q)∂tf(t, q) dq = r
∫
φ′(q)p(q)(κ−
∫
pf dq)f dq
+
rNh
2
∫
φ′′(q)p(q)
(
(κ−
∫
pf dq)2 +
∫
p(1− p)f dq/N
)
f dq. (A.6)
Since the equation holds for an arbitrary test function φ, we obtain a partial
differential equation for f :
∂tf + r(κ− a)∂q(pf)−
1
2
(rNh(κ− a)2 + rhb)∂2q (pf) = 0,
where
a =
∫
p(q)f(t, q) dq, b =
∫
p(q)(1− p(q))f(t, q) dq, κ =
c
N
, r =
Nh
τ
.
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For the second model of learning (3), instead of (A.1), the updating rule
prescribes
Xn+1 = Xn + h(c− mˆn)− δˆnh.
Repeating the arguments of the previous case we obtain the equation
∂tf + r(κ− a)∂q(f)−
1
2
(rNh(κ− a)2 + rhb)∂2q (f) = 0,
where a, b are the same as above.
Appendix B. Two time scales
Formulas (7) and (8) are obtained by taking moments of the equation (6).
We multiply the equation by p(q) and integrate in q. Assuming the f(t, q)
decays fast enough at infinity we find an ODE for the average entry rate
a(t) :
da
dt
= r
(∫
p′pf(t, q) dq
)
(κ− a) +
1
2
(rNh(κ− a)2 + rhb)
∫
p′′pf dq. (B.1)
The ODE is still not closed as it depends on an integral of f. However, since
p(q), p′(q) > 0 and ∫
p′pf dq ≤ max{p′(q)p(q)},
it is of the order 1 and we substitute it with a suitable positive constant c(p).
Moreover, since Nh ≈ τ and h are small, the contribution of the last term
in (B.1) can be ignored and we obtain the equation
da
dt
= rc(p) (κ− a) , (B.2)
and
a(t) = κ+ (a(0)− κ)e−c(p)rt.
Thus, the ratio (a(t)−κ)/(a(0)−κ) decreases to zero with the characteristic
time length τal = 1/r.
It is harder to obtain an analytical expression for the coefficient of sorting.
Qualitatively, the sorting occurs due to the diffusion of the density f. We will
proceed heuristically, postulating that the rate of decrease of the coefficient
of sorting is proportional to the diffusion
(rNh(κ− a(t))2 + rhb(t))/2.
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Since this quantity is asymptotically smaller the the drift r(κ − a(t)), the
diffusion is of the order rhb(t)/2. Thus, we obtain that
db
dt
≈ −
rh
2
b,
and b(t) ≈ b(0)e−rht/2. This formula implies that the ratio b(t)/b(0) decreases
to zero at the characteristic time τs = 2/(rh).
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